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Objectives. In choosing candidates to support in congressional elections, voters consider both policy and nonpolicy factors. However, the relative importance of incumbency or presidential approval versus candidates' ideological platforms likely varies across elections. Specifically, stiffer electoral competition should encourage ideology‐based voting because candidate information is more plentiful. In contrast, incumbents' ability to garner votes simply by virtue of already holding office should depress proximity voting in elections with incumbents.Methods. Using data from the 1988–1992 Pooled Senate Election Study, I estimate logistic regression models of individual vote choice.Results. I find that open‐seat elections do promote the use of candidate ideological proximity in the voting calculus but that the effects of election competitiveness are less clear.Conclusions. The findings have important implications for normative democratic theory, for our constitutional framework, and for elite behavior and aggregate‐level electoral outcomes.

Objective. The Downsian model of electoral competition with its individual‐level assumption of proximity voting by individuals implies that candidates in two‐party systems should perform better in elections when they adopt platforms more closely mirroring preferences of average constituents. Since extant analyses do not place candidates and constituents on a common ideological metric, they do not directly test the electoral consequences of proximity to voters. This study provides a direct test.Methods. I use the NES Senate Election Study to locate candidates and constituents on a common ideological metric and use ordinary least squares regression models to analyze the effects of candidate positioning on electoral outcomes.Results. Although stiff electoral competition may make it more likely that candidates gain votes by locating near average citizens, candidate proximity does not generally have a meaningful effect on Senate elections.Conclusions. Insignificant electoral benefits from ideological centrism may help explain candidate divergence in elections and has important implications for the nature of representation.

Objective. The Downsian model of electoral competition with its individual-level assumption of proximity voting by individuals implies that candidates in two-party systems should perform better in elections when they adopt platforms more closely mirroring preferences of average constituents. Since extant analyses do not place candidates & constituents on a common ideological metric, they do not directly test the electoral consequences of proximity to voters. This study provides a direct test. Methods. I use the NES Senate Election Study to locate candidates & constituents on a common ideological metric & use ordinary least squares regression models to analyze the effects of candidate positioning on electoral outcomes. Results. Although stiff electoral competition may make it more likely that candidates gain votes by locating near average citizens, candidate proximity does not generally have a meaningful effect on Senate elections. Conclusions. Insignificant electoral benefits from ideological centrism may help explain candidate divergence in elections & has important implications for the nature of representation. 3 Tables, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

Federalism and separated institutions within levels of government in the American political system complicate citizen assessments of government. Using data from a statewide survey of Kentucky residents, we examine citizen trust in national, state, and local governments and citizen approval of state government institutions. We find trust to be highest in local government and approval to be highest of the state Supreme Court. Contrary to expectations, approval of the governor is not greater than that of the legislature and trust in the state government falls short of that in the national government. We contend that these patterns reflect problems facing the governor at the time of the survey rather than an ordering of trust and approval distinctive in Kentucky. Finally, in explaining both trust and institutional approval, we highlight the importance of partisanship and party control of governmental institutions.

AbstractVirtually all accounts of political trust in the US regard declining trust over the past half-century to be troubling. We argue that these interpretations are in need of reassessment since they often are rooted in the normatively questionable assumption that higher trust is always desirable. We review traditions in democratic theory and American thought extolling the virtues of skepticism and distrust of government and discuss potential problems in common trust measures and conclusions based on them. Using data from the 2014 General Social Survey, we explore relationships between trust, commitment to being vigilant watchdogs of government, and attitudes and behaviors generally considered desirable for a healthy democracy. Our findings indicate that higher trust is not always accompanied by characteristics of good democratic citizens. In fact, it is those individuals who exhibit lower levels of trust with high levels of vigilance who are most politically engaged. Thus, healthy skepticism of government may contribute to the vitality of democracy.